Pinter's "Semantic Uncertainty" and Critically "Inescapable" Certainties by Merritt, Susan Hollis
Fall 1986 4 9 
Pinter's "Semantic Uncertainty" and Critically 
"Inescapable" Certainties 
Susan Hollis Merritt* 
Well, some people would envy your certainty. . . . 
—Lenny (to Teddy) in The Homecoming (3: 68)1 
When Austin Quigley descried a lack of progress in Pinter criticism, in 
1975, due to " the uncertainty that has characterized responses to Pinter 's 
work" (PP xvii), he seemed to suggest that a sign of critical progress is the 
reduction of uncertainty. Debates about uncertainty recur frequently not only 
in commentary about Pinter but throughout much contemporary criticism. In 
the following account of attitudes toward uncertainty evinced by some Pinter 
critics, I try to relate changing directions in Pinter criticism to currents and 
crosscurrents influencing dramatic theory and criticism. 
In 1973, the same year that Quigley completed " T h e Dynamics of 
Dialogue," the early version of The Pinter Problem, Tener argued, " n o one has 
pointed out that Pinter varies a theme central to Ionesco's and Beckett's 
dramas" : " the relationship between man and reality as expressed by man 's 
mythmaking tendencies and as seen in his language" (175). "Everything is 
uncertain," and Pinter uncovers " the semantic uncertainty which underlies 
experience." 
Today some would perhaps modify this statement to read that nothing 
"underl ies" our experience and that, rather, it is we who impose structure on 
it. Projecting our own "semantic uncertainty" onto what we experience (live, 
read, and write), it is we who are uncertain. In part as a response to 
" m o d e r n " and "pos tmodern" writers—Beckett, Ionesco, Barthes, Derrida, 
Foucault, Borges, Calvino, Fowles, Pinter—we are able to see this "inescapa-
ble t ru th" about ourselves. 
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Of course, Tener was not the first to point out the theme of "uncer ta inty" 
in Pinter 's work. By the seventies, Pinter's "ambigui ty" was already a cliché 
of criticism. In 1971, Rickert described a trend: 
there is a growing body of Pinter criticism full of contradiction. 
Everyone has his explanation of a Pinter play, and the problem of 
puzzling Pinter has become so great that some critics have taken the 
position that it is impossible for us to know a Pinter play. We cannot 
explicate his work; we can only react to it, because he consciously and 
deliberately constructs his plays to create an unknowable world. (30) 
This Sontagian stance characterizes some more recent Pinter criticism too.2 
As Sontag created a strong impression on my own developing literary 
critical ideas in the late sixties, in part paving the way for my receptivity to 
reader- and audience-response approaches to writing by Pinter and others, so 
she has had a powerful impact on many others in literary studies.3 Along with 
Sontag, who was herself an early reader of Barthes, importing this French 
critic's writings to the United States (In 1982 she published The Barthes 
Reader), more "academic"-based critics have joined the "against interpreta-
t ion" movement. Culler's contribution is entitled "Beyond Interpretation."4 
What we now refer to as "poststructuralism" has impulses in Sontag's early 
manifesto urging an "erotics of a r t , " though it extends in a variety of ways to 
much other contemporary writing.5 
As critics develop the "uncer ta in ty" issue in writing about Pinter's plays, 
then, they illustrate larger critical and theoretical trends. In this essay I 
chronicle changing views of Pinter 's "ambigui ty ," beginning with Tener and 
Schechner, then moving through a debate about The Dumb Waiter (1957) in 
Modern Drama involving Carpenter, Quigley, and Van Laan. After this 
excursion through academic Pinter criticism, I try to show how my own 
experience of a (non-academic) production of The Dumb Waiter has enhanced 
my understanding of responses to the play and how it relates to this literary 
critical debate. Finally, I review Quigley's more recent formulation of Pinter's 
drama raising the issue of uncertainty to the level of Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle and Einstein's theory of relativity, in order to suggest some far-
reaching contexts for Pinter 's dramatic world. 
Such metaphors empower critics as they transform uncertainty into 
certitude. When they build metaphors into interpretive strategies, critics 
formulate "concrete abstractions" theoretically expressing their own practical 
interactions with the experiences being interpreted and thus fulfill their own 
felt needs as audience members and readers. The value of these strategies— 
their truth-value for other critics—is mostly their usefulness in manufacturing 
more "ce r ta in" interpretations. I call critical certitude into question, urging 
greater tolerance of uncertainty to forge humanistic change.6 
The earliest and perhaps most confident discussion of uncertainty or 
ambiguity in Pinter is Schechner's "Puzzling Pinter ," published in 1966, the 
same year as Sontag's Against Interpretation. Schechner argues that " the essential 
characteristic of Pinter 's work is its conceptual incompleteness" (177; empha-
sis added). Though Pinter presents "insoluble riddles," he differs from "that 
other great riddler, Pirandello. Pirandello built his plays around contradic-
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tions, Pinter around conceptual incompletion. We cannot know in Pirandello; 
we shall not know in Pinter" (184).7 
Anticipating Almansi and Henderson's ' 'post-modernist" account of 
Pinter, Schechner warns critics away from explaining Pinter 's "ac t ion" 
realistically so as not to deflect attention from " the moves and counter-moves 
[of the characters], and the thickening web of strategies" (182). Before Iser 
discussed indeterminacy and reading, before poststructuralist hermeneutics, 
Schechner writes, " T h e information we are given should be sufficient. The 
structure allows for gaps. To be prompted into filling them—either with 
thematic speculation or realistic detail—is to be misled" (182).8 
"Semantic uncertainty" is Tener 's label for " the Pinter formula."9 As if 
the metaphor formula could help predict structure, texture, and theme in 
Pinter's plays, its usage militates against this perception of ambiguity. Like 
any formula, semantic uncertainty results from an aim to reduce thematic 
uncertainty to critical certainty. 
For me the Modern Drama debate involving Carpenter, Quigley, and Van 
Laan about The Dumb Waiter symbolizes a shift from the positivistic objec-
tivism of New Criticism and structuralism to the essentialism of nominal 
pluralism and poststructuralism.10 Vis-à-vis their own somewhat conflicting 
interpretations of the same play, these critics register a certainty in the 
Tightness of their methods and findings at odds with some of their own 
interpretive principles and hermeneutic pronouncements regarding Pinter 's 
work. 
Publishing in 1973, the same year as Tener on Pinter 's "semantic 
uncertainty," Carpenter faults Pinter criticism for taking The Dumb Waiter too 
seriously as an example of "existential absurdity" and hence overemphasiz-
ing its " m e n a c e " at the expense of its comedy; previous critics "have 
drastically misunderstood the play." Instead: "Actually it is a mock-melodra-
matic farce"; even " a n hour 's worth of sheer, rich fun." The "b l inders" 
resulting from earlier critics' "preconceptions of profundity" caused them 
" to misread clear-cut stage directions, to overlook giveaway lines of dialogue, 
to miscalculate obvious indicators of tone—in general, to resist perceiving the 
depths (or heights) of frivolity that the play achieves" (280). 
Critics' detection of "portentous reverberations" in the " ludicrous" 
events of The Dumb Waiter like Ben and Gus's debate whether to say "light the 
kettle," "light the gas ," or "pu t on the kettle" and their attempts to fill 
orders for such exotic dishes as "Ormi tha Macarounada" (1 : 141-43, 152) 
buttress Carpenter 's thesis that "instead of reflecting the arbitrary, alogical 
meaninglessness of the Camus-Sartre universe in the manner of Waiting for 
Godot/' The Dumb Waiter "establishes its own singular world: a nutty, unlife-
like, non-alogical world of farce." Instead of depicting Heideggerian " d r e a d " 
("a generalized sense of hysteria prompted by the mere chaotic nature of 
things"), it is "mock melodrama" and a parody of absurdity (280-81).u 
Despite its parodie manner, The Dumb Waiter, Carpenter argues, has 
something serious about it: Ben's "irked rejoinder" to Gus's repeated queries 
—"What ' s one thing to do with another?" (1: 161)—is "one of the few things 
in the play that can be taken seriously" (282). Ben is echoing "one of Harold 
Pinter's many warnings to critics," this one from an interview that Pinter 
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gave about his film Accident: " T h e most we know for sure is that the things 
which have happened have happened in a certain order: any connections we 
think we see, or choose to make, are pure guesswork" (282).12 
Far more important to Carpenter than this motif of critical uncertainty are 
aspects of the play's certain lack of seriousness. He argues that the play's 
"astounding finale" (1: 164-65) is one thing that "certainly cannot b e " taken 
seriously. As this sequence "absolutely defies critical gravity," "any feasible 
hypothesis" resulting from a "search for rational explanations" of it must be 
"fraught with improbablity" (282-84). But, Carpenter supposes, even though 
"like the whole play, the last hovering image roguishly exposes the absurdity 
of d read ," today's critics "have to say something else—perhaps the asininity 
of funk" (284-86).13 
Perhaps challenged by Carpenter 's admonitions against searching for 
"rational explanations" of the end of The Dumb Waiter, Quigley bravely (and 
gravely) enters the debate with his 1978 Modern Drama article. In describing 
The Dumb Waiter as " a puzzling play which is rendered even more puzzling by 
its abrupt termination at precisely the point at which we feel that something 
decisive is finally about to happen ," Quigley reminds us that the play's "final 
tableau" is "climaxed not by a gunshot, nor by the lowering of Ben's gun, but 
by a long, silent s tare ." To surmise Gus's subsequent murder is "interesting 
but irrelevant speculation" (1). 
Moving from the audience's uncertainty about Gus's fate to other 
ambiguities that he notices in the play, Quigley considers the general 
epistemological issue of uncertainty and the characters' relative attitudes 
toward their " incomplete" knowledge of what is going on in the play. He 
attempts to find a general meaning applicable to " a series of seemingly trivial 
incidents that would not be out of place in a music-hall sketch," which, he 
points out, are "so bizarre and so frequent" as to make Carpenter deny "any 
seriousness of theme" to The Dumb Waiter when he classifies it as a "mock-
melodramatic farce" (7n2). Against Carpenter, " the seeming trivia of the 
play" acquire " a distinctly nontrivial function," and " the initially trivial" 
become "ultimately central" to what Quigley perceives as the play's epis-
temological theme of uncertainty (7). 
Quigley's move here resembles the Derridean deconstructive strategy 
whereby the "marg ina l " or "supplemental" becomes "cent ra l" or "cru-
cial ," reversing a prior hierarchy of values.14 Uncertainty permeates the 
world of The Dumb Waiter: 
The incomplete nature of [Ben's and Gus's] knowledge of their 
professional situation might seem abnormal and bizarre, but placed in 
the context of the issues which the audience has accepted with laughter 
early in the play, it becomes a suddenly recognized norm. And by the 
same token, the similarity between the conclusion and these earlier 
[apparently trivial] events renders them no longer simply humorous, 
but disturbing examples of a world shaken suddenly loose from the 
security and certainty of its assumed moorings. (7)15 
As Quigley extends this epistemological issue to " o u r " world, he recalls 
Schechner: " the worrying point . . . established by these incidents is that we 
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do indeed operate all of the time on information that is from one point of view 
or another disturbingly incomplete*' (7). But he goes beyond Schechner: 
In the context of the play, not having sufficient information upon 
which to base specific actions becomes only a special case of the wider 
problem of anyone ever having sufficient information upon which 
justifiably to base any action. (7-8)16 
For Quigley "Th i s is the final and climaxing dimension of the themes of 
incomplete information and displacement of cause from effect that permeate 
the play" (10). Pinter undermines " the tacit dimension of understanding." 
As the " t r iv ia l" becomes "crucia l ," 
The various attempts by both characters to explain the unexplained, to 
unite cause with effect and effect with cause, to transform the 
recurringly bizarre into the basically reasonable, gradually transcend 
the limited context in which they occur. . . .17 
Quigley agrees with Carpenter; Pinter 's "undermin ing" of the "tacit 
dimension of understanding" cannot adequately be described by " tha t much 
abused term, the Absurd ." But he gives different reasons for the inadequacy 
of this label. While the play focuses on " the incompleteness of the characters' 
knowledge and control, ' ' it does not end by asserting the consequent uselessness of 
" the pursuit of knowledge and the exercise of control ." Rather, The Dumb 
Waiter, Quigley argues, "demonstrates . . . the danger of losing sight of the 
inevitable incompleteness and inexactness of our knowledge in almost all 
situations in which we find ourselves involved." So Quigley generalizes again 
from the plight of the characters to that of the audience: "For the audience in 
the theatre, the organization for which Ben and Gus work remains appropri-
ately and disturbingly offstage. . . . " Through this interpretive interpolation 
he transforms " the play i t se l f into " a manifestation of its own thematic 
concerns" (10). 
Apparently unaware of his own critical intervention here, as he "makes 
sense" of Pinter's play, Quigley projects back onto it the "thematic concerns" 
that he considers "its o w n , " himself displacing cause from effect. 
Our belief in the existence of the organization, in its control of the 
situation in general and of the dumb waiter [sic] in particular, remains 
for us, as well as for Gus and Ben, a necessary but unconfirmed 
surmise—resting, as always, upon incomplete information. (10) 
Undermining " the tacit dimension of understanding" creates what Quigley 
calls the audience's "epistemological impasse." But the critic's "epis-
temological impasse" also is reflected back upon itself (as Quigley's own later 
view of Pinter will suggest). Instead of " a denouement of a theatrical 
murder ," the audience "finds itself . . . staring uncertainly at the two 
transfixed characters, who are also staring, equally uncertain, at each other" 
(11). With this last image, Quigley registers both the self-consciousness and 
the ambiguity of twentieth-century art forms.18 Turning " the play's focus" 
away from meaninglessness to meaning by making The Dumb Waiter manifest 
"its own thematic concerns," Quigley " tu rns the screw" of interpretation of 
The Dumb Waiter (and Pinter's plays in general) one more turn.1 9 
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With another twist, Van Laan judges most previous commentaries 
' ' ra ther unsatisfactory" (494). "Instead of analyzing the play as Pinter wrote 
i t , " he complains, "most commentators rely on distortions and fabrications— 
or, at best conclusions based on guesswork—to concoct a new play of their own 
making" (emphasis added). Though adept at using The Dumb Waiter against its 
other commentators, Van Laan never notices how his own commentary is 
implicated in the process he himself defines, even as my metacommentary 
"inevitably" is here. 
Van Laan 's own "concoction" of The Dumb Waiter questioning the so-
called "legit imacy" of "filling i n " (495) recalls Schechner's admonitions 
against "filling" Pinter 's " g a p s . " The first variation on a "sequence of three 
occasions during which Ben calls attention to an item in his newspaper" (1: 
130,131-32, 163-64), when Ben reads to Gus about a girl who killed a cat and 
they decide her brother really did it, is "crucia l ." Van Laan argues that 
Pinter uses Ben and Gus " to mirror his audience," creating " a burlesque 
version of the commentators, a built-in before-the-fact put-down of their 
similar act of 'filling in' in order to make a presented situation conform to the 
sense of reality the viewer has brought to i t" (495-96). The second-variation, 
when Ben reads nothing aloud, may imply 
that people like Ben and Gus (and most of his commentators) scarcely 
need any objective data to inspire them when making pronouncements 
about the reality external to their minds, that their "responses" may 
not be responses at all but self-activated and self-gratifying percep-
tions, relying almost exclusively on internalized stereotypes. (496-97) 
Van Laan excepts from this generalization not only himself but "two 
commentators" on the play who "have managed to avoid sounding like Ben 
and Gus identifying the real murderer of a cat" (497): Carpenter and 
Quigley. Although at first he seems to accept both "concoctions," ultimately 
Van Laan rejects Carpenter 's and Quigley's in order to make his own. 
Carpenter "proper ly" makes fun of " the typical responses" to the play 
but his account is flawed. Not only does he fail to recognize Pinter's burlesque 
of commentary, but his "ultimate response" is "questionable and trou-
blesome" because, as Quigley has already pointed out, it "refuses to take the 
play seriously," distorting "what is in actuality a profound piece of d rama" 
(Van Laan 497-98; emphasis added). We come full circle, back to Carpenter 's 
starting point, his idea that critics of The Dumb Waiter have taken the play as 
too profound, missing its farcical comedy. 
While Quigley does take the play "very seriously," providing " the best 
reading . . . yet to appear ," still "Excellent as it i s , " it is "not entirely 
satisfying" for two main reasons: (1) Like the other commentators on The 
Dumb Waiter, Quigley provides "considerable explanation of what the charac-
ters are going through during their final stare, and while what he has to say is 
far subtler than the usual thing, it nonetheless borders upon 'filling in' " ; and 
(2) a "difficulty" Van Laan considers "far more impor tant"—"l ike his 
brilliant and indispensable book, The Pinter Problem, " Quigley's article on The 
Dumb Waiter "may very well make a bit too much sense" (497-98). 
Through his readings of Pinter, Quigley provides us with a lens for 
viewing the plays which frees us from having to endure the kind of 
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experience that Ben and Gus go through and that so many spectators 
of Pinter's plays have felt themselves going through. In the case of The 
Dumb Waiter, by clarifying the real action of the play as thoroughly as 
he does and by ignoring some of its more refractory elements, Quigley 
domesticates it almost as effectively as do those who turn it into 
familiar melodrama. (498)20 
This argument puts the commentator of the play in a " n o win" situation; one 
cannot explain the "uncer ta in ty" experience without being accused of 
reducing that experience of uncertainty to certainties: " too much sense." 
As I have been saying about Tener 's reduction of Pinter 's writing to " the 
Pinter formula" and these other critics' formulaic extensions of uncertainty to 
"p roper" interpretive procedure, given what commentators still generally 
aim to do—to make meaning out of experience (reading, theatre, art, other 
events)—this sort of reduction would seem inevitable. As we will see, Van 
Laan cannot escape reducing Pinter 's plays to " too much sense" either. 
But another way to regard this reduction (in each case) is to consider it as 
an enhancement. As in the chemical reduction occurring when metals are 
derived (purified) from ores, to some degree critics attempt to "concentra te" 
the "essence" of Pinter's plays. And like the reduction in entropy, or disorder, 
occurring when a compound precipitates from a solution, this critical 
concentration (or "essentializing") reduces uncertainty. Paradoxically, then, 
some reductions of Pinter 's "puzzl ing" plays enhance them by increasing their 
intellectual value, or enlarging their worth as intellectual "currency." 
As reducing bauxite to aluminum increases its value, a "critical strategy" 
can have economic value in the academic marketplace. And as for an owner of 
a metal processing plant, for a critic value comes not only from what is 
produced but also from the method, the "opera t ion ." If it is reproducible, 
replicable, capable of extensive duplication, like a metallurgist creating a new 
"refining" process, a critic is " in business." Carpenter 's metaphor scum/ 
essence borrowed from Pinter's The Dwarfs suggests likewise that a result of 
criticism, symbolic interpretations, is the " s c u m " skimmed off and either 
discarded or " so ld" as "was te" ; the valuable "essence" desired from the 
literary-critical transaction is thus the "by-product ." From Pinter 's view-
point, critics' "guessing games" are a "waste of t ime" (Gussow 43). The play 
is its own essence; its value is self-contained or contained within it and not 
something extractable.21 
As Van Laan reduces and enhances The Dumb Waiter, " the real focus of the 
play's energies"—the " r e a l " theme—becomes "as much 'about ' the rela-
tionship the dramatist has chosen to have with his audience as it is about any-
thing else" (498). Van Laan describes this interplay as a kind of contradiction: 
"with one hand Pinter beckons us to speculate while with the other he 
disciplines us for so doing" (498). By reading The Dumb Waiter as a play about 
the dramatist 's chosen relationship with his audience—by seeing this topic as 
central to the play—Van Laan engages in a common postmodern reduction/ 
enhancement of literature: It is about itself. This parallels Quigley's notion 
that the play manifests "its own thematic concerns."2 2 
But Van Laan answers anticipated objections to the circularity of this 
common thematic rendering: 
56 Journa l of Dramat i c T h e o r y and Cri t ic i sm 
All dramatists establish some kind of relationship with their spectators, 
but as long as it is the traditional—and comfortable—one in which the 
dramatist serves us as trustworthy and unobtrusive presenter of the 
material, we are not likely to notice the relationship as part of our 
experience of the play. (498-99) 
In The Dumb Waiter Pinter alters " the traditional model" so that "his 
relationship to us becomes a central element of the d rama" (499; emphasis 
added). To understand the play, Van Laan argues, we must explain his choice 
of this relationship. 
Pinter disorients us "with regard to the proper rules for spectator response" 
in order to force us " to experience much the same kind of thing as Ben and 
G u s " (499; emphasis added). But potentially more interesting than this 
experience for Van Laan is an alternative "explanation" seeing Pinter as " a 
dramatist who is exploring his medium rather than merely exploiting i t" (499). 
Instead of "making meaningful events ," like " the traditional dramatist ," 
Pinter may be "far more interested" in investigating " the process by which 
meaningful events are m a d e " (499). To enhance the experience oîThe Dumb 
Waiter Van Laan thus stresses what he sees as Pinter's shift of interest. 
But he goes further. The proper way to regard The Dumb Waiter is to see it as 
a play that mocks the very "responses it encourages us to make" and makes us 
"far more conscious of our responses as such and of ourselves as responding 
beings than is normally the case when we are watching a play" (Van Laan 
499).23 The Dumb Waiter thus becomes " a commentary of sorts on our role as 
spectators while watching any play"; it enables us to notice our own meaning-
making activities: how "by making connections of various kinds, we always 
contribute to the shaping of the meaningful events presented to us in the theatre" 
(499; emphasis added). 
As his commentary remakes Pinter's play into commentary, Van Laan 
considers the consequences of what he calls Pinter's "manipulation of the 
audience," turning the screw still further: 
But since Pinter prompts us to reflect on our contributions to shaping 
his play's action rather than to discerning the meaning of that action, his 
manipulation of the audience in The Dumb Waiter . . . calls into 
question the conventions of traditional drama and the familiar assump-
tions about reality upon which these conventions are based.24 
As Van Laan countervails these "familiar assumptions," he recalls Car-
penter's earlier objections to "rational explanations" of Pinter's play.25 This 
context puts Van Laan's earlier criticism of Quigley for making "too much 
sense" into stronger terms: it makes what Van Laan labels Quigley's critical 
traditionalism " inappropr ia te" to Pinter's plays. 
Turning the screw now a complete circle, Van Laan generalizes from the 
single Pinter play to drama overall: "Pinter ' s manipulation of us in The Dumb 
Waiter asks us to question the validity of the traditional conventions of action 
in drama. . . . " But Pinter "probably does this only in passing, for he seems 
to be after bigger game" (emphasis added). What is the "bigger game" that 
Pinter is after? What is Van Laan's own larger target? 
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Although we tend to respond to drama on the basis of what we have 
learned from our past exposure to drama—and other literary forms— 
we probably think of ourselves as responding to it as we respond to life 
outside the theater. Pinter is thus prompting us to review our 
assumptions about reality, to ask whether events themselves actually 
exist independently of our consciousness, our supposed response to 
them, or whether, on the contrary, our consciousness, instead of 
merely interpreting events, does not %—Iin fact also create them. The 
Dumb Waiter seems to ask, does an event acquire only its meaning 
from the way we connect data, or does it also acquire, through this 
process, its very existence? (499-500; emphasis added) 
In support of this last alternative, echoing his own opening gambit against 
"conclusions based on guesswork," Van Laan quotes Pinter, as cited earlier 
by Carpenter: " T h e most we know for sure is that the things which have 
happened have happened in a certain order: any connections we think we see, 
or choose to make, are pure guesswork" (500). 
Van Laan builds a generalization about reading Pinter's work as a whole 
from this discussion of reading The Dumb Waiter. This play teaches us how to 
read all of Pinter. It teaches us the lesson that "whatever legitimacy 'filling in' 
may have elsewhere—and its legitimacy for any dramatist remains undemons-
trated—it is for Pinter at best a very risky process."2 6 Van Laan's account of 
Pinter's intention, of what he "actual ly" means, argues that Pinter is "no t 
trying—and failing—to create a coherent action of the traditional sort"; 
rather, he is doing "something new and different." As critics, we should not 
rely on " the traditional model . . . to complete his plotting for h i m , " but, 
instead, we should use it only " to discern exactly when and how he deviates 
from i t ." Pinter did not mean us to ignore or to discount or to argue away the 
"atypical" in his plays (500).27 
For Van Laan Pinter's "very essence" is his defiance of "ou r expectations 
about life and/or d r ama" through "dizzying dislocations in which a stylistic 
mode that we have grown comfortable with [naturalism] abruptly gives way to 
a strikingly different one" (500). The "atypical effects" in Pinter 's plays 
substitute for " the coherent action" of traditional plays. Recalling Schechner, 
Van Laan argues that such effects—"not some action that we have ourselves 
invented"—are " the proper focus of our interpretive powers and appropriately 
engage our efforts to discern meaning and significance" (500; emphasis 
added).' 
As Van Laan issues these particular normative recommendations for 
reading Pinter, he connects the so-called "atypical" in Pinter's plays with his 
"handling of the relationship between the dramatist and his audience" 
(500-01). Van Laan's conclusion extends his metaphor of the game (Pinter 
"seems to be after bigger game") : 
In keeping with our usual role as spectators at a Pinter drama, we have 
become a part of his play. He has, in other words, been playing with us 
and playing us in order to make sure that our responses get called into 
play and into the play—that they become not just passive adjuncts to 
the dramatic experience but active and indispensable elements of its 
total design. (501)28 
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While I myself feel sympathetic toward Van Laan's enhancement of 
Pinter, I also recognize that attitude as both a cause and an effect of my own 
immersion in reader- and audience-oriented critical inquiry. My leaning 
functions projectively on Pinter 's plays and commentary about them. 
Whereas Van Laan sees himself as understanding what he regards as a 
"preoccupat ion" and an " interes t" of Pinter 's, I see both myself and Van 
Laan as also projecting our own critical preoccupations and interests on 
Pinter 's plays (and on Pinter criticism)—and, hence, finding them there. As 
we enhance Pinter 's plays, we reduce both them and commentary about them 
to allegories of our readings.29 
Carpenter, Quigley, and Van Laan say nothing explicit about interre-
lations between the " t ex t s " that they have concocted for The Dumb Waiter and 
specific actual performances of the play. Yet what they say could have 
important consequences for the theatrical production of The Dumb Waiter and 
other plays. Recent interest in performance study allying academic scholars 
with theatre professionals suggests the rich possibilities of exploring multiple 
interpretations in performing plays.30 
The Dumb Waiter may not be produced as often as some of Pinter's others 
(like The Birthday Party, The Caretaker, The Homecoming, or Old Times) because it 
has generally not been considered "major , " or as " impor tan t" as them.31 
That is one reason why I was delighted to attend a performance of The Dumb 
Waiter in a London pub in the summer of 1982. This " luncht ime" theatre 
performance at The Finborough Arms began with a sandwich on the way in, 
ordered from the playbill's "Lunchpack M e n u , " listing "Ormi tha Mac-
arounada" and "beer (with crisps)." (Balancing paper plates and cups 
throughout the performance further realized this metaphor of food being 
served.) Upstairs from the pub proper, the play was performed on a make-do 
stage by two actors on brief reprieve from a West :End production of The Sound 
of Music. 
Their renditions bespoke definite ("certain") interpretations of their 
roles, accentuating Ben's assertive dominance and Gus's intermittent subser-
vience. This Gus (Nicholas Lumley)—alternately passive and inquisitive, his 
interrogative mode punctuated by dependence and attendance on Ben's 
commands—and this Ben (Graham Fawcett)—continually annoyed by Gus's 
every question and gesture (no matter how slight), by his very presence—were 
an "odd couple": more like mismatched domestic partners than professional 
killers.32 This portrayal underlined the comic dimension discussed by Car-
penter; it was very funny and evoked much laughter, especially from me.3 3 
I found this production both poignant and thought-provoking as well as 
funny. Ben's treatment of Gus as if his every gesture, his very being, was 
gratuitous—unnecessary, superfluous, absurdly de trop—took on a more 
serious dimension when Gus's superfluity in the process being dramatized on 
stage—his (hypothesized) replacement by another "kil ler" after he would be 
gone—became both a critical (crucial) assumption necessary for understanding 
and a critical (interpretive) consequence of my own response to this particular 
theatrical interpretation of the play. 
Gus is replaceable if he does not behave properly, or according to Ben's (and/ 
or Wilson's) purposes. To extend the domestic metaphor, there is a kind of 
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separation or divorce this "coup le" is about to experience as a result of their 
incompatibility. They just don't get along, and their various conflicts (such as 
whether one says "light the kettle" or "pu t on the kettle") effectively 
dramatize this " fact" of their lives.34 
My own experience and understanding of such discord enables me to 
elaborate the domestic metaphor in re-constructing this production. But 
whether a pair are life partners, business partners, partners in crime (the 
hitmen most presume Ben and Gus literally are), roommates (as Davies and 
Aston are, for a while, in The Caretaker), old friends (as Hirst and Spooner 
would have themselves in No Man's Land)—even author and critic, or 
academic colleagues—merely varies this experiential gestalt. Each of us builds 
versions of The Dumb Waiter out of metaphors selected from (associations to) 
our own experiences. Everyday or common experiences form (if only in part) 
"bases" for our critical understanding, "g rounds" for our eidetic reductions 
or enhancements of dramatic ambiguity, "foundations" for structures we 
impose. 
As Van Laan suggests, what "under l ies" our interpretations of experience 
is other experience. It can serve as "scaffolding" for our ideas as we 
rationalize our experience. Drawing critical metaphors from experience 
("l i terary" and other kinds) supplies an important source of understanding. 
As Culler intimates, we use such "s tor ies" to make the " incoherent" cohere. 
On a literal level, often critics see Ben ("the senior par tner") as an agent 
of an organization; Wilson seems to be the boss. Then, in symbolically 
hierarchical readings, Ben stands (in) for some micro-authority figure: the 
" top banana , " even (as I have suggested) a husband, wife, or other partner; 
and Wilson for some macro-authority figure: He, They, God, the Supreme 
Author or Organization Man. In Van Laan's re-symbolization, the micro-
action (literal) and the macro-action (figurative) merge: the conflict is between 
a supreme author (Pinter) and his audience (us). This reductive enhancement 
stresses that, like Gus (and Ben), we are all " d u m b waiters," whose uncertain 
destiny may be at some other's apparent bidding and at still another's actual 
doing. Though we are "part icipat ing," someone else "calls the shots ." 
These allegorical re-constructions—whether epistemological or some other 
kind—relate to our own situations. That so many people do fill in (even if only 
momentarily) the murder of Gus, the expulsion of Davies, the punishment of 
Stanley, or the sexual background of Ruth (or any number of other omitted 
endings and beginnings) signals their horizons of understanding and their 
own humanness: their meaning-making authority. Interpreting a play (even 
while we are watching it)—connecting unconnected dots, crossing uncrossed 
ts, "filling i n " gaps—does rationalize the irrational, but in this respect it 
merely resembles what we do with our other experience, which we have also 
learned " to interpret ." As Carpenter, Quigley, Van Laan, and the rest of us 
question one another's procedures for'meaning-making, we only substitute 
more or less sophisticated versions of the same. 
Though to some it may appear arbitrary or improper, a theatrical 
production re-produces a play so as to re-create (for an audience) a so-called 
"meaningful experience," just as any reading of a play ("crit ical" or 
otherwise) attempts to do. While fashionable, denying the importance of 
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meaning to dramatic experience can also appear as a kind of meaning-
mongering.3 5 To legislate an end to "filling i n " missing dramatic details, as 
Van Laan seems to advocate, limits the procedure of making meaning for this 
experience. Yet, closing Pinter's "openness" in his own way, Van Laan first 
plugs the holes with theory and then turns theory into a dramatic theme. 
At The Finborough Arms, it seemed (to me, though not necessarily to 
Gus) that Ben was hiding not only his knowledge of what was going on 
(however limited it is), but also his own sense of his lack of knowledge. (Critics 
seem to hide the latter more than the former.) While Gus appeared sensitive to 
Ben's discomfort yet ignorant of its source, Ben seemed extremely jumpy, 
defensive. I imagined that before the action begins, Ben has been asked to 
keep an eye on Gus (perhaps when the car stopped [1: 135]), that there are 
already some doubts about Gus's ability to function. In the midst of their 
"l inguistic" argument, Ben asks Gus: "Who ' s the senior partner here, me or 
you?" and when Gus acknowledges that Ben is, Ben says, " I ' m only looking 
after your interests, Gus. You've got to learn, ma te . " Along with his lack of 
readiness to follow Ben's orders, Gus's recurrent questions and his express 
repugnance about the girl previously killed (1: 146-47) could imply his 
unsuitability for the job. In the course of the play, he does not " l ea rn" or if he 
does (during the final stare), this learning occurs possibly too late for him to 
benefit from his knowledge: he is facing Ben's pointed gun. At some time (in 
plays, in life) there may not be another chance to act "appropriately" toward 
"author i ty ." Even though we, like Gus, may have passed earlier " tes t s" (1: 
162), we too may fail an ultimate one. There may be no "next t ime." 
Imaginatively extending the end of the play creates dramatic afterlife. 
The image of Ben, who presumably should know but may not, as hiding, 
concealing the "real meaning" of the action from Gus (for whatever motives) 
serves audiences and critics as an icon for Pinter, the author.36 Like Ben, the 
"senior par tner ," or Wilson, the author Pinter, they feel, is concealing the 
"real meaning" (of the movements of the dumbwaiter, of other events of the 
play, of the relationship between author and audience, of Life). When, like 
Ben, Pinter has protested that (no "prophe t" ) he does not know these " t r u e " 
meanings (Once finished revising and rehearsing, he too enters the audience), 
many have argued that Pinter protests too much.3 7 
Some interaction between Pinter's plays (as texts and theatre experiences) 
and their audiences and commentators occurs; however, the causes and effects 
of the interaction probably cannot be pinpointed. Perhaps no one can be 
certain exactly where Pinter's thematic "preoccupation" or " interest" begins 
and our own ends. The most we can do, as Pinter has suggested, is "guess . " 
With " informed" judgment, we can arrive at a qualified certainty—a 
certitude (a feeling of absolute sureness or conviction) at best—if indeed 
certainty is what we are after (as so many disclaim).38 
Pinter enables what we must (on some "level") already know, the so-
called "famil iar"—the "same old th ing ," the "tradi t ional ," the "conven-
tional"—to interact with what we do not already know, the so-called 
"unfamil iar"—the "different," the " n e w , " the " innovat ive," the "non-
traditional," the "unconvent ional ." 3 9 As unfamiliar becomes recognizable, 
some would rather reject what they see and feel. 
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In The Modern Stage and Other Worlds, Quigley extensively reformulates his 
critical position on modern drama, Pinter 's included. But, reminiscent of 
Tener's " the Pinter formula," Quigley's "reformulation" verges on the 
formulaic in some respects, as he presents it as a means of reading modern 
plays in "appropr ia te" ways. Like Van Laan's , Quigley's tendency towards 
denning what is appropriate in dramatic criticism is prescriptive; some 
approaches are more "p rope r " (right) than others.40 For Quigley at this 
juncture, regarding plays as philosophical inquiries is more "appropr ia te" 
(right) than approaching them otherwise.41 This position might confine critics 
who prefer to accentuate the experiential aspect of drama and theatre to 
intellectual inquiry, but it enlarges their role as theorists (philosophical 
workers). 
Quigley extends Van Laan's insights, engaging " t radi t ion" and "nov-
elty," claiming that "these issues of relating old and new" acquire " a peculiar 
structural and thematic importance" in Pinter's play Betrayal {MS 221). To 
explain Pinter's "extensive use of well-made-play elements" alongside the 
unconventional, Quigley uses scientific paradigms, elaborating on both the 
"uncertainty theme" and Schechner's earlier concept of Pinter 's use of 
"incomplete information" (222-24).42 As we become involved in our "ex-
planatory activities," most often we disregard this "potential for circularity" 
and feel as though, somehow, we have circumvented the problem. As my own 
critical allegorizing The Finborough Arms production of The Dumb Waiter 
does too (I see retrospectively), Quigley's discussion of Betrayal manifests this 
ability to repress cognitive awareness of " the hermeneutic circle" while 
making meaning. 
Pinter's treatment of certainty and uncertainty reverses "one of the basic 
thematic consequences of the well-made-play structure . . . the reinforcement 
of an attitude towards the nature of explanation, experience and truth that is 
easily accepted as the only reasonable one" (Quigley, Af£224).43 This attitude 
is "not . . . the only possible attitude, nor the only reasonable attitude, 
towards such things. . . . although it provides the basis for one mode of 
explanation in Pinter plays, it is by no means the dominant one, nor the one 
that gives the plays their disturbing and disorientating quality" (224). In 
contrast, what Quigley defines as Pinter's attitude duplicates parts of 
Quigley's own earlier theoretical argument; it favors pluralism over dualism 
or Hegelian dialectics.44 
The "key point ," says Quigley, is that " the characters, like the dramatist, 
are persistently engaged in a struggle not so much to locate the truths that 
underlie inherited structures, as to create the kinds of structures that will 
embody acceptable t ru ths" (MS 225). Given Van Laan's concern with 
audience, one could extend this "s t ruggle" to the domain of the audience; 
and, given my concern with critics as members of the audience with 
specialized interests, to their domain as well. 
As Schechner was doing in conceptualizing Pinter's "conceptual in-
completeness," Tener in devising " the Pinter formula," Carpenter in 
turning absurdity into farce, Quigley first in employing " the tacit dimension 
of understanding" and then again in relating structural, thematic, and 
textural "conventions" and " innovat ions" to epistemology, Van Laan in 
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playing with "Pinter ' s play with the audience," and as I am doing in 
structuring "critical strategies"—so we are all trying " to create the kinds of 
structures that will embody acceptable t ru ths ." The " theme of uncertainty" 
becomes the certain theme of both Pinter's plays and commentaries on them. 
And yet, in an important way, it remains the uncertain theme.4 5 
Van Laan shows himself "filling i n " omitted details of The Caretaker 
ostensibly to illustrate the risks of doing so with The Dumb Waiter and other 
Pinter plays and drama in general. But this interpolation enables him to 
construct his interpretive stance. Quigley seemed unaware of his own earlier 
intervention in The Dumb Waiter. Perhaps now he would acknowledge that his 
interpretation of the " issues" central to Betrayal is likely to be duplicating his 
own "reformulat ion" of the relationship between conventions of the modern 
stage and attitudes toward a "process of explanation" leading "back towards 
i t se l f : this "dramatized recognition of the inescapable interaction for 
characters, for dramatist and for audience, of things known and the ways of 
knowing that help generate them." 4 6 Such an interactive circularity seems 
"inescapable": once one has turned the screw of interpretation far enough, it 
seems to unscrew itself, to deconstruct. 
And yet I say " s e e m s " inescapable, for I cannot be certain it is. This 
uncertainty is an effect of my own immersion " i n " Pinter's plays and 
contemporary criticism and theory. In poststructuralist, functional terms, it 
would be called a reading-effect. Like the philosopher Teddy, in The Homecoming, 
some critics do not want to get "lost in i t" (3: 77-78); yet, we do get 
implicated by the very stuff of our inquiry.47 Given Quigley's own intertextual 
involvement in and intersubjective relationship with modern plays, philoso-
phy, and criticism, given his reading and re-reading of Pinter in the context of 
his own experience (reading and otherwise) and his reading and re-reading of 
other writers in the context of this reading of Tinter—Pinter 's " inqu i ry" 
(William James 's , Goodman's , Quigley's)—where does it all "beg in" and 
where does it " e n d ? " We have Said's "beginnings" and Kermode's "end-
ings"; but, to extend Lenny, "Philosophically speaking," what are they? 
What have we got and what are we "going to do with" them? Where are we 
"going to t ake" what we have gotten "ho ld" of?48 We have all these 
reverberations of " the table leg"—the supposedly certain thing—the "thing-
ness" of texts. Themes, rituals, games, fantasies, and dreams: this is the 
"stuff ' criticism is made of, as critical Teddy boys strive to maintain 
"intellectual equil ibrium," a "way of being able to look at the world."4 9 
While perhaps at times more nearly "lost in i t , " Pinter himself would perhaps 
rather savor living.50 
As Holland once wrote, "Any critic is first and foremost a member of the 
audience. . . . A critic experiences the work of art initially as anyone else 
does" {Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare 314). Many theorists would question how 
closely "specialist" and "non-specialist" aesthetic encounters do resemble 
one another. Still, a "recognition of the inescapable interaction . . . of things 
known and the ways of knowing that help generate them" escapes many 
critics and scholars, as it does other audience members, characters, and 
dramatists. If this "recognit ion" is dramatized by Pinter in his plays and felt 
dramatically by critics, they re-dramatize it in their commentaries. Put into terms 
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that would antagonize any playwright, especially Pinter: as they " m a k e " and 
" r e m a k e " the plays, "formulate and reformulate" them, the critics would 
seem the playwright's certain " d o i n g " and " u n d o i n g . " They—the critics— 
would seem inescapable. 
I say "would seem" because to say otherwise would give critics a privilege 
that they do not always have.51 Such Derridean "strategic interventions" 
occur when Quigley uses philosophical metaphors to describe modern dra-
matic literature as "d r ama of inquiry in a pluralistic world" and when I 
identify "rhetorical strategies" in critical discourse and see various "solu-
t ions" to Pinter's "puzzles" (such as "semantic uncertainty" and "dramas 
of inquiry") as metaphors for (understanding) them.5 2 
If plays endure (both as theatre and as texts), it may be in part also because 
critics' work returns readers to them. But when readers do turn back to 
dramas like Pinter 's after having read criticism of them, or turn to them first 
with criticism in hand, these texts are altered in the reading by the writing 
about them. They are re-read after they have been re-written. Such interac-
tive alterations of Pinter's work by Pinter criticism (and of Pinter criticism by 
Pinter and by other Pinter critics) seem inescapable, no matter how hard each 
of us may try to escape noticing them. 
As this critically "inescapable" certainty, this certitude, becomes a 
platitude, Pinter criticism, and dramatic criticism and theory along with it, 
progresses, advances, as it were. Critical progress is metaphorical in that it 
occurs through metaphors—new ways of seeing—chosen by critics to substitute 
for (the experience of) plays.53 As plays are both aspects of our environment 
and productions involving other people, to regard them experientially is to 
interact with them in ways that create what Lakoff and Johnson call "mutua l 
change" (230): we change them and they change us, and through our 
criticism of them, we change one another. 
When we accept other critics' metaphors as truths, we are saying, " W e 
understand," in their terms.5 4 Their metaphors, their new ways of seeing the 
dramatic world—and critical strategies built on them—become effective 
means to control the uncontrollable, name the unnamable, master the 
unmasterable: to know this unknowable but still inescapable member of our 
universe of discourse. As critics, we work to control, name, master, and know, 
but never can we escape language. Though we may strive to get "beyond" it, 
we cannot. Would we (who work and play in language) be more happy if we 
could? Or is a portion of our happiness the price of our knowledge?55 
Our enhanced sense of the language of drama and theatre incorporates 
nonverbal as well as verbal performance. It enables us to "unders tand" these 
phenomena through a variety of structures—metaphors—in new ways, if no 
more or less certainly. If our inability to reach certain understanding has become 
a new inescapable critical certainty, our certitude founds new critical enter-
prises through which we hope to advance, at least intellectually. 
Pinter's most recent political plays may stimulate some of us to scrutinize 
where we, the human race, are heading. As we critics attempt to bridge the 
still vast chasm between invented categories of "experience" (personal, 
ethical, social, economic, political, professional, cultural, intellectual, semi-
otiç) and myths of "knowledge" (objectivist, subjectivist, experientialist), do 
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we know where we will go with the new structures, the new strategies? Even if 
progressing uncertainly, we venture exploring "myster ious" interrelations of 
life and drama, experience and knowledge. Whatever paths we choose entail 
risks and responsibilities, so we must proceed carefully. 
Oregon State University 
Notes 
1. Throughout this essay, parenthetical volume and page references to Pinter 's writings are 
to his Complete Works. 
2. See Gale 's collection of seventeen new essays on Pinter, originally intended to commemo-
rate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Pinter 's first play, The Room: "Nei ther this volume nor any of 
the individual essays . . . is trying to give the answer to what Pinter and his works are all about. 
Rather, as in the dramatist 's plays, the attempt has been made to provide a wide range of 
possibilities . . . " (HP 20). Most of these "representative examples of some of the diverse critical 
approaches that have been applied to Pinter 's wri t ing" explicate Pinter 's themes and techniques, 
though some emphasize felt experience. Fuegi relates " the uncertainty principle" to Pinter 's 
" m o d e r n d r a m a " in the concluding essay. 
3. "Susan Sontag's Against Interpretation was well received because her ardent attack upon the 
objectivism of traditional exegetical practice highlighted the contradiction that exists between 
modern literature and traditional interpretation when the latter reduces the polyvalence of the 
'open work' (opera aperta) to an ostensibly pre-given meaning, hidden in the text or to be sought 
behind i t " (Jauss, "Li te ra ture and Hermeneut ics" 135). For Jauss 's source of this concept open 
work, see Eco 3-43. While " t h e creative or productive role of the reader" is celebrated " a s a 
major insight of reader-oriented cri t icism," Culler observes, " text and reader can switch places" 
so that " a story of the reader structuring the text easily becomes a story of the text provoking 
certain responses and actively controlling the reader ." This "easy shift between freedom and 
constra int" in some recent theoretical accounts ("narrat ive constructs") of reading marks Eco's 
discussions of "open works , " which " requi re readers to write the text through their read ing ." In 
such "stories of r ead ing" so-called open texts, " 'The free interpretive choices elicited by a 
purposeful strategy of openness ' [Eco 40] can be considered or narrated as acts provoked by the 
manipulative strategy of a scheming au thor . " In Fish's story of reading a Walter Pater sentence, 
" t he more active, projective, or creative the reader is, the more she [or he] is manipulated by the 
sentence or by the a u t h o r " (OD 70-71). (Cf. de Man , Blindness and Insight 285-87.) An assumption 
of this phenomenon seems to operate in critics' accounts^ of reading Pinter 's dramas. See 
Chaudhur i on cultivating reader- and spectator-orientations in dramatic criticism " i n order to 
erase the gap between theory and its object" (296). 
4. Culler 's claim here that " there are many tasks that confront criticism, many things we 
need to advance our understanding of literature, but . . . one thing we do not need . . . is more 
interpretations of literary works" (246) has raised much debate. Peck builds his arguments for 
reforms in critical practice and the curricula of advanced literary study on Culler 's essay. Cain 
observes an unresolved " t e n s i o n " in Culler 's work between his argument against interpretation 
and his unintentional perpetuation of " the New Critical legacy of ' interpretat ion ' " ("English in 
America Reconsidered" 90nl0) . 
5. Compar ing Sontag's " e ro t i c s , " which attempts to recover our sensory experience by 
attending to form rather than content, to Culler 's proposed "poe t ics" or "semiot ics ," Ulmer 
contends that poetics (" the study of problems about the nature of literature: its forms, its 
components, their relat ions" [PS 218]) exchanges " the great realism of New Critical methods for 
the great abstraction of a theory whose purpose, as Tzvetan Todorov once noted, is to perfect its 
own discourse" (557). 
6. Cain observes that " t h e intellectual . . . is not naturally a questioner and skeptic, is not 
necessarily responsive to or interested in change, but rather 'craves certitude' and is prone to 
accept half- truths" (Crisis in Criticism 10). (Cain 's own use of half-truths may imply a belief in some 
"whole t r u th . " ) The following discussion of Pinter criticism shows several critics both engaged in 
skeptical questioning and concerned with change, but still craving certitude while negotiating a 
minefield of obstacles to truth, not the least of which is the concept of the "essential t r u t h " about 
Pinter 's plays and dramatic phenomena in general. 
7. Cf. Rickert 30. 
8. Iser and some poststructuralists would be more concerned with textual and structural 
features requiring such "fi l l ing" in, examining this "p rocess" of interpretation as a phenomenon 
(causes and effects), while those more sympathetic to psychology would scrutinize it as a 
behavioral or psychic activity (stimuli and responses, relations between " s e l f and " o t h e r , " 
" sub jec t " and "ob jec t " ) . 
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9. This formula "contains two conflicting themes" : (1) " a bare sketch of values anchored to 
a middle or lower social class perception of reality and of human behaviour by the monotonous 
linguistic habits of the speakers and the commonplace si tuat ions"; and (2) " a rich texture of 
ambiguity sutured to the primitive, inner, dark, mysterious, emotional biological man by what he 
fears, often some unknown external hostile force or agent reflected in a line or action or situation 
ultimately affecting all the characters ." Pinter 's " s i tua t ions" occur "within a r o o m , " with 
" b o t h " the room and the situations interracting with the characters. Their "linguistic hab i t s " 
reveal " this interact ion." The " r e su l t " is " a room-situation-character-language relationship 
which is continually developing throughout the time of the play" (176). 
10. See Mitchell, Pluralism, for a series of articles by pluralists critical of the tendency towards 
dogmatism in pluralism. Yet even White 's critique posits " a genuine pluralist" (as he identifies 
himself [486]) and is thus characteristic of essentialism (true pluralism). In "Wri t ing for the 
T h e a t r e , " Pinter suggested that " there can be no hard distinctions between what is real and what 
is unreal, nor between what is true and what is false. A thing is not necessarily either true or false; 
it can be both true and false" (1 : 11). But White writes, "Stories are not true or false, but rather 
more or less intelligible, coherent, consistent, persuasive, and so on. And this is true of historical, 
no less than of fictional, stories" (492; emphasis added). Despite his willingness " t o bear the label 
of radical relativist in matters having to do with historical knowledge" (486), White does not appear 
to see his own account of critical theories in the same terms. Culler speculates that truth may play 
" a n indespensable role in argument and analysis" because of its "persistent duplici ty": " T r u t h 
is both what can be demonstrated within an accepted framework and what simply is the case, 
whether or not anyone could believe it or validate i t . " A " p a r a d o x " often encountered in 
philosophy, literary criticism, and history "doubt less" occurs in other disciplines: on the one 
hand, "champions of an absolutist, correspondence theory of t r u t h " appeal to "pragmat ic 
g rounds"—"i t has desirable consequences, is necessary to the preservation of essential va lues" ; 
on the other hand, "proponents of a pragmatist v iew" argue that "whatever the consequences of 
their relativism, we must live with them because this is the truth, the way things are: truth is 
relative, dependent on a conceptual framework." "Both attempts to maintain a position give rise 
to a deconstructive movement in which the logic of the argument used to defend a position 
contradicts the position affirmed" (OD 154-55). 
11. Cf. Diamond 93-109. She sees the play's language as affirming " the parodist 's careful and 
ironic overlay of material, making double entendres from colloquialisms just as he makes gags 
from simple movements" (108). "Stacking character confusion against audience uncer ta inty," 
Diamond argues, "P in te r places unverifiability at the center of our experience of the comic" ; her 
analysis of Pinter 's plays focuses on " the subtle relationship between stage comedy and uneasy 
audience response" (13). 
12. Carpenter cites Taylor 184. Pinter also said: " I do so hate the becauses of drama. Who are 
we to say that this happens because that happened, that one thing is the consequence of another? 
How do we know? What reason have we to suppose that life is so neat and tidy? . . . Life is much 
more mysterious than plays make it out to be. And it is this mystery which fascinates me: what 
happens between the words, what happens when no words are spoken. . . . however much you 
see and guess at there is always that something more. . . . " (The last two ellipses are Taylor 's .) 
Cf. Nightingale on characters' motives in The Homecoming: " W e ' r e never quite sure. . . . 
something still remains uncertain and perhaps unknowable, doomed to elude our prying noses. 
Pinter has a respect for people's privacy: he always sets bounds to our, and probably his own, 
understanding of t h e m " (74). Also cf. Mort imer 719. For Cima this "playwriting s t rategy" is 
"c inemat ic , " creating specific demands on audiences and actors. The Servant, the first of Pinter ' s 
"revolutionary filmic exper iments" (Cima 45), was written in 1962, five years after The Dumb 
Waiter-. Pinter 's text describes Ben's tone in his repeated rejoinder to Gus 's questioning the 
connection between " W h o sen t" the matches and " W h o " is upstairs as nervous {"nervously"). 
Ben may be nervous (as well as annoyed, bothered, or disgusted [irked]) because of the implications 
of "one th ing" having " t o d o " with " a n o t h e r , " since Gus implies a connection as opposed to a lack 
of a connection between what Ben may have at first considered unconnected events, or between 
what Ben may now surmise to.be connected events (He Adjust spoken to someone upstairs, whose 
voice he may recognize [1: 156]). This reading infers a connection between Ben's tone and his 
knowledge or lack of knowledge about the two events. Though Carpenter generalizes the 
significance of Ben's rejoinder, connecting it to Pinter 's statement about Accident, he also points 
out, " i t would be ridiculous to grant Ben much intellectual acumen . . . " (282). There seems to 
be some connection between Carpenter ' s own "intellectual a c u m e n " in tying Ben's lines to Pinter 's 
" se r ious" statements about Accident—which, unquestioned, has in part spawned the responses by 
Quigley and- Van Laan discussed below—and the prominence of the theme of uncertainty in 
Pinter criticism. 
13. Cf. Carpenter ' s more recent commentaries on The Birthday Party, The Caretaker, and The 
Homecoming with the article on The Dumb Waiter. "Almost certainly the key to an unders tanding" of 
The Caretaker is Mick's statement to Davies, "Every word you speak is open to any number of 
different interpretat ions" ( "Qu icksand" 65; emphasis added). Contrary to his earlier position on 
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The Dumb Waiter, here he says that, despite Pinter 's deliberate obscuration, it is "possible . . . to 
detect a broad framework of motives [near psychosis] which, when applied to baffling moments in 
the play, compels them to yield the gist (if not the totality) of their 'secrets' " (69). Reversing his 
anti-absurdism stance with respect to The Dumb Waiter, next he argues that " 'Pinteresque' 
m o m e n t s " put an audience "precisely in the dilemma of Camus ' s 'absurd man ' described in The 
Myth of Sisyphus. We are confronted with bewilderment, disruption, chaos, what Beckett referred 
to as 'this buzzing confusion' " ( " 'Vict ims ' " 490). " I n response," he adds: 
we involuntarily reach out for clarity, understanding, Godot: the little explanation that is 
not there. We become like Ionesco's Detective in Victims of Duty, who lays its underpin-
nings bare: " I don ' t believe in the absurd. Everything hangs together; everything can be 
comprehended . . . [sic] thanks to the achievements of human thought and science." (490) 
Aiming " t o exemplify the direction that might be taken by critical analysis which tries to be 
faithful to the genuine absurd experience of The Homecoming as it unfolds," though admitting it 
"migh t be approached from many other points of view," he still finds it "unfor tuna te" that "Few 
critics in the past fifteen years have taken an approach that accepts and even relishes the absurdity 
of Pinter 's depicted world" and thus fail to resist " the urge to chase the will-o'-the-wisp of a 
solution to [its] mind-bending indeterminacies" (494-95; emphasis added). "Ionesco's Detectives 
have been at work , " violating the play's " inherent n a t u r e " (495). Revising his article on The 
Birthday Party, Carpenter notes that its 
reception . . . over the years has convinced me that the sceptical colouring I had given it is 
far too easy to ignore or shrug off. Yet a major point of the essay is that a critical reading of 
a Pinter play must be essentially speculative and inconclusive. This updated version 
therefore includes, not only further documentation of my argument, but also several 
"coun te r -no tes" designed explicitly to undermine some of its shakier props—leaving 
them, in the mode of Derrida, "legible yet effaced." (93nl ; emphasis added) 
The concluding paragraph remains the same in both versions. The title comes from Len's speech 
to Mark in The Dwarfs (1960), describing his uncertainty about who or what this other person is: 
" W h a t have I seen, the scum or the essence?" (2: 112). (The metaphor is drawn from ocean 
tides.) A Derridean might observe the paradox that Carpenter both urges his readers to "bea r in 
mind that fallout of any type"—symbolic or otherwise—"is more akin to scum than to essence" 
and stresses his "major po in t " still locating the "essence" of Pinter and of critical readings of his 
work ("essentially speculative and inconclusive"). 
14. For discussion of Derr ida 's writings and their influence on criticism, see Culler, Norris, 
and other works suggested by Jay and Miller 189. Cf. the hierarchical reversals in Derrida 's 
critique of Saussure's "pr iv i leging" of speech over writings wherein what Saussure judged 
" m a r g i n a l " (writing) becomes " c e n t r a l " (See Culler, "Jacques Der r ida" 167-68). For a 
summary of the " m o v e s " involved in deconstructing an opposition, see Culler, OD 150. Cain 
observes that such handbooks or guides to Derrida "inevitably domesticate his work, untangle the 
gnarled, tortuous prose, and give us access to new interpretive schemes" ("English in America 
Reconsidered" 90). 
15. Among other examples, Quigley considers Ben's "explanation of the misbehavior of the 
lavatory" — " I t ' s got a deficient ballcock, that 's a l l" (1 : 133). 
16. Quigley reassesses the play's title, finding a "further implication" to be that 
like the d u m b waiter itself, [the characters] are governed and controlled by forces beyond 
their ability to know and understand. The strings by which the dumb waiter is 
manipulated and controlled are no more visible and no more understandable than those 
which control not only the environment but also the behavior of the characters onstage. (9) 
17. T h e characters ' attempts at sense-making make more sense to Quigley in paradigmatic 
terms borrowed from Kermode: people's efforts " t o make sense" of their life " s p a n " through 
"Active concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems" (10, citing 
Kermode 7). 
18. See Hutcheon 's study of " the implications for theory of modern artistic pract ice" (1). 
Claiming to derive her "so-called ' theory' of pa rody" from " the teachings of the texts 
themselves, rather than from any theoretical structure imposed from wi thout ," she concludes: 
Parody today cannot be explained totally in structuralist terms of form, in the hermeneutic 
context of response, in a semiotic-ideological framework, or in a post-structuralist 
absorption of everything into textuality. Yet the complex determinants of parody in some 
way involve all of these current critical perspectives—and many more. It is in this way that 
parody can, inadvertently perhaps, serve another useful function today: it can call into 
question the temptation toward the monolithic in modern theory. If many perspectives 
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help us understand this pervasive modern phenomenon, but if none is sufficient in itself, 
then how could we claim that a structuralist, semiotic, hermeneutic, or deconstructive 
approach was in itself totally adequate to the task? This is not so much an argument for 
critical pluralism as it is a plea for theory that is a response to aesthetic realities. (116) 
19. I borrow this phrase from Felman's "posts tructural is t" reading of Henry James ' s tale The 
Turn of the Screw. Cf. this maneuver in Schechner's concluding paragraph: 
If there is a " m e a n i n g " in Pinter, it seems to me closely related to both Henry James and 
Franz Kafka. James was most interested in probing the human psyche to its depths of 
confusion and fragmentary bases. Kafka was always telling stories in which his heroes had 
no sense of what was happening to them. Combine these two, and I think you have what 
Pinter seeks. (184) 
20. This argument against Quigley resembles Norris ' description of deconstruction as " i n 
part . . . a vigilant reaction against [a] tendency in structuralist thought to tame and domesticate 
its own best insights" (2-3). Some of Derr ida 's "mos t powerful" essays aim at "dismant l ing a 
concept of 's tructure ' that serves to immobilize the play of meaning in a text and reduce it to a 
manageable compass" (3). 
21. Culler 's analysis of " the idea of a discipline" as " the idea of an investigation in which 
writing might be brought to an e n d " may apply to writers like Pinter as well as critical writers: 
Literary critics, dismayed by the proliferation of interpretations and the prospect of a 
future in which writing will breed ever more writing so long as academic journals and 
university presses survive, frequently attempt to imagine ways of bringing writing to an 
end by reformulating the goals of literary criticism to make it a true discipline. Claims 
about the true purpose oî criticism usually define tasks that could in principle be 
completed. They invoke the hope of saying the last word, arresting the process of 
commentary. In fact, this hope of getting it right is what inspires critics to write, even 
though they simultaneously know that writing never puts an end to writing. Paradoxically, 
the more powerful and authoritative an interpretation, the more writing it generates. (OD 
90) 
22. Cf. Diamond 's view of the play as a parody of the "established conventions" of American 
gangster films and British detective stage plays; for her it is " a b o u t " these conventions. 
Thompson claims that the "ambivalent end ing" of The Dumb Waiter is necessitated by Pinter 's 
mixing elements from circus, thrillers, and music-hall (77). 
23. Van Laan uses a kind of stimulus-response model for Pinter 's " p l a y " with his audience. 
As Pinter prompts us "simultaneously to make guesses about what is happening in the play and to 
question ourselves self-consciously for doing s o , " he 
asks us to focus not only on the play but also on ourselves, and to perceive ourselves not as 
passive attenders to a meaningful event shaped for us by another, but as quite uneasy 
collaborators with the dramatist , striving against difficulties and probably in vain to 
complete something that cannot fully exist without our participation. (499) 
Van Laan 's generalization from his own experience as an audience member aims to redress what 
he considers " inappropr i a t e" responses to Pinter 's plays. Even if Pinter does " p r o m p t " his 
audience, many still fail to respond as dutifully as he would like. For Van Laan they would be 
responding " imprope r ly" to the play. Cf. Hudgins 115. 
24. Cf. Diamond: 
In the theatre . . . Pinter 's playful theatrical tricks prevent our dwelling on metaphysical 
ironies. Through a "long silence," we stare at the tableau of Ben aiming his gun at Gus. 
Once again they are dumb waiters. So are we: on the edge of our seats wondering if the 
gun will go off. The fact that it does not go off mocks our tension and reminds us that 
Pinter 's parody lays bare the conventions of realism. (108) 
25. Van Laan considers traditional 
the popular assumption that a phenomenon such as an event exists objectively, independ-
ent of the consciousness that apprehends it, and that the proper role of this consciousness 
in relation to such a phenomenon is to perceive it and, where necessary, to interpret its 
significance by the appropriate means—usually, the laws of reason. (499) 
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26. Van Laan argues that it is misleading to "fill i n " Pinter 's gaps: 
To decide that Gus is the next victim, or that Mick is troubled by his brother Aston's 
evident inability to get hold of himself, or that Ruth used to be a whore before marrying 
Teddy may be extremely tempting, but conclusions of this sort put too much weight on 
inference; they tend to eliminate the uncertainty of detail and response which is a valid 
element of a Pinter play, and they distract our attention from what Pinter has actually put 
into the play toward what we think we find there. (500; emphasis added) 
27. "Atypical qualities of Pinter 's plays" such as " the bizarre behavior of the dumb waiter ," 
" M i c k ' s surrealistic speeches," and " the non-transition-like transitions of The Homecoming," Van 
Laan concludes, suggest that Pinter 's aims differ from those of the "na tura l i s t . " Pinter, in 
contrast, "mixes naturalism and stylization so that the seams may show and, to change 
metaphors, one manner clash with ano the r" (500). 
28. Van Laan has already explained further: 
Pinter tries to keep us disoriented so that we can remain aware of our own mental and 
emotional processes, of our involvement in the play and its making. This preoccupation of 
Pinter 's reflects his deep interest, not only in The Dumb Waiter but elsewhere, in the 
question of how events, in d rama or life, are defined. (501) 
The "faint smi le" exchanged between Aston and Mick in The Caretaker also manifests "this 
interest ," as Pinter "encourages us to revise our entire conception of what is hppening in the 
play": 
Before this smile . . . we had generally come to think of the action as being about Davies, 
about his efforts to maintain his beachhead in Aston's room notwithstanding the odds 
posed against him by the peculiarities of the two brothers and his own antisocial 
characteristics. But the smile, by suggesting some kind of conspiratorial link between the 
two brothers, encourages us both to infer that the action really centers on them, and to see 
it, in the terms of Robert P. Murphy, as " a cruel game, a game consciously and 
maliciously played on [Davies] . . . by both Aston and Mick . " (See n7; the last ellipsis is 
Van Laan 's . ) 
As Van Laan "fills i n " these missing details, his own example confirms his theory, but he qualifies 
Murphy ' s " reve la t ion" as " too stunning to be entirely convincing": "P in te r steadfastly refuses 
to confirm or deny the validity of the new view. As a result, we properly leave The Caretaker with two 
different, discordant conceptions of its ac t ion" (501; emphasis added). Cf. Fuegi 204-06. 
29. See Culler: 
Reading is an attempt to understand writing by determining the referential and rhetorical 
modes of a text, translating the figurative into the literal, for example, and removing 
obstacles in the quest for a coherent result, but the construction of texts—especially of 
literary works, where pragmatic contexts do not so readily justify a confident distinction 
between the literal and the figurative or the referential and the nonreferential—may block 
this process of understanding. (OD 81) 
Citing de M a n on how " t h e possibility of reading can never be taken for granted" (Blindness and 
Insight 107) and how rhetoric "pu t s an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or 
unders tand ing" (Allegories of Reading 131), Culler observes: " T h e reader may be placed in 
impossible situations where there is no happy issue but only the possibility of playing out roles 
dramatized in the text. " Yet, as he adds, while those who believe that "one cannot authoritatively 
determine, by reading a text, what is in it and what is n o t " turn to " the experience of the reader" 
in order to establish "ano the r basis for poetics and for particular interpretat ions," it is " n o easier 
to say what is in the reader 's or a reader 's experience than what is in the text" ; for " 'experience' 
is divided and deferred—already behind us as something to be recovered, yet still before us as 
something to be p roduced . " What results is "no t a new foundation but stories of reading . . . 
[that] reinstate the text as an agent with definite qualities or properties, since this yields more 
precise and dramatic narratives as well as creating a possibility of learning that lets one celebrate 
great works . " Tha t Culler sees deconstruction as able to explore " the problematic situation to 
which stories of reading have led u s " and as " the culmination of recent work on reading" (OD 
81-83) demonstrates the introjective/projective interplay at work in any reading-theory, including 
de M a n ' s . 
30. Rabkin considers " T h e question of the relationship between the play and its theatrical 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " to be " a t the center of contemporary theatre theory" (142, 146). A review of 
Shakespeare scholarship by Paul reports this trend: " m o r e scholars are consulting—either 
formally or informally—with directors on productions of Shakespeare's plays. . . . Their goal is 
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to expand the options from which directors can choose, not to impose a particular interpreta t ion" 
(6). Such consultation has taken place between some Pinter scholars and directors of his plays. 
Shewey reports on the "great influence" of Gabbard ' s psychoanalytical approach to Pinter on her 
former student John Malkovich, who directed the Steppenwolf Theatre Company productions of 
The Caretaker (1978 in Chicago, 1986 in New York). Gabbard corresponded with another 
American director, Terry Schreiber, who had already staged The Birthday Party and done 
"extensive pre-production work" on The Homecoming, Old Times, The Dumb Waiter, and The 
Caretaker, when he wrote her requesting advice about extending her theories to his staging of 
Betrayal for the Syracuse Stage Theatre in 1981. 
31 . Such canonic value judgments lead to revisionist debates (like the one I have been 
discussing)—attempts to re-evaluate the presumably " m i n o r " works of a major author—and are 
the subject of "Critical Value Judgments of Pinter 's P lays ," the penultimate chapter of Pinter in 
Play. 
32. Among the earliest critics to discuss Pinter 's " coup le s , " Cohn, in " T h e Absurdly 
Absurd , " compares Ben and Gus to Beckett's vaudevillian " p a i r , " Vladimir and Estragon; in 
"Lat te r Day P in te r , " she discusses the relationships between Pinter 's other characters in scenes 
"a deux. " On Pinter 's parody of vaudeville in the relation between Gus and Ben, see Diamond, 
whose research for Pinter's Comic Play was guided by Cohn (Diamond 9). On some earlier Pinter 
critics' metaphors for relationships between Pinter 's male characters, see Elliott 356. See 
Thompson on links between Pinter 's acting roles in the fifties and these character relationships. 
33. In an interview on the occasion of the American première of The Hothouse (1958), in 1982, 
Pinter remarked that it disturbs him that people don' t enjoy the humor of his plays as he would 
like: 
Audiences and critics and possibly some productions, too, take these damn plays of mine 
so seriously and so solemnly and I find that very uncomfortable. . . . They are really quite 
funny. Mind you there is a point where they stop being funny. I 'm not saying they are 
roaring farces. I 'm just saying they are taken too seriously on the whole. But there isn't 
anything I can do about it. (Gale, "P in te r Believes" A16) 
Reviews of the first London production of The Dumb Waiter were mixed; though some expressed 
frustration with " P i n t e r ' s " failure to provide a meaningful experience, at least one critic stressed 
how "extremely funny" it was (Alvarez 150). In " A Play and Its Polit ics," Pinter acknowledges 
that he still has a "sense of fun" but does not "consider it to be appropriate to [the] subject [of One 
for the Road (1984)]"—torture, rape, and murder. He explains in some detail how his "object ive" 
has changed since " the early days" when he wrote The Dumb Waiter (11). 
34. Thompson observes that while " G u s and Ben seem to be carrying their linguistic 
argument to ludicrous extremes . . . [it] focuses our attention on the shakiness of the professional 
relationship between the two g u n m e n " (118). Mort imer uses this "linguistic a r g u m e n t " as a 
metaphor for " the habitual attitudes of the playwright and the cr i t ic ," with Ben symbolizing " the 
defensive au thor" and Gus " the frowning literary journalist doggedly in search of his message" 
(718). As this allegory develops, Mort imer has Gus wondering "uneas i ly" : " if there were no 
hidden meanings what need would there be for critics to reveal t h e m ? " It is " h a r d , " Mort imer 
decides, "for critics and intelligent audiences to accept" what he calls " the t ru th" : " tha t , as a 
kettle is made to boil water, so a play is written to work on the stage, and not as a messianic scroll 
containing the key to the universe ." Complex linguistic arguments locating the " k e y " to Pinter 's 
and other writers' "un ive r ses" often occur among critics whose work is not " p r o p e r l y " matched 
with one, another 's purposes, and academic " m u r d e r s " may ensue. 
35. My phrase alters Almansi and Henderson 's "mot ive-monger ing" (17). Cf. Carpenter ' s 
description of the critic as a "profundi ty-monger" ( " T h e Absurdity of D r e a d " 281). 
36. For all we know, this could be the end of an elaborate " c o n . " Complaints that Pinter is 
such a con man have been common and are cited in Elliott 3. Cf. Almansi and Henderson esp. 
11-23, 93; for them Pinter plays "con- t r icks" on his audience, and his characters on one another. 
This view that Pinter plays games with his audience parallels Van Laan ' s concept of Pinter 's play 
with the audience. Also see Prentice. 
37. Early on, Pinter became impatient with demands for first " t he mean ing" and then " t h e 
meanings" of his plays, I discuss his reaction to these demands in "Haro ld Pinter on His Critics 
and Audiences ," a section of Pinter in Play. He has expressed his displeasure with such demands in 
both his playwriting and his speaking and writing about it. As early as Night School (1959) he 
played upon this controversy (and was accused of self-parody and formula writing, which he has 
since accepted as just accusations); hints of self-mockery and mockery of his audiences and critics 
can be discerned in many of his plays. In 1964, in Tea Party he had one of Disson's twin sons 
(Tom) say, " I ' v e often wondered what 'mean ' m e a n s " (3: 115). Almansi and Henderson cite this 
dialogue, seeing it in the context of logical positivism and New Criticism as Pinter 's "obl ique jibe 
at the impossibility of [the] aim [of these enterprises]" (73). 
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38. See Elliott for a speculative study of this interaction. Since this work was completed, 
inquiry into such matters of literary response has burgeoned. Pinter himself has "said that he 
really had no idea how his works connected with audiences": " 'Something does happen. There ' s 
a lot of irritation and hatred. But there 's also a good deal of positive response. But I can' t say what 
it 's all about really' " (Gale, ' T i n t e r Believes" A16). Perhaps we must accept undecidability or 
uncertainty when dealing with the function of audience response. For example, I do not know 
"which comes first" intellectual (" thoughtful") or emotional ("felt") identifications. Hudgins 
posits that intellectual identifications are prior to emotional ones (104-05). While I tend to think 
the opposite, I would acknowledge that distinctions between the so-called intellectual and the so-
called emotional are questionable, for by the time we apprehend our thoughts and feelings, they 
have become mixed phenomena. Separation into intellectual and emotional is a dualistic 
convention, based on human observation. 
39. This "exper ien t ia l " perspective combines Iser's structuralist theory that readers learn from 
understanding the "unfami l i a r " in literature {The Act of Reading) and more psychologically based 
theories expounded by Bleich and Holland that such learning is based on readers' associations 
with " fami l ia r" aspects of texts. This perspective can also take into account Fish's pronounce-
ments about the importance of "interpret ive convent ions." 
40. Quigley bases his own philosophical pluralism on that of William James and on Nelson 
Goodman, who emphasizes " r ight versions" of "wor ld s . " See especially MS 41-43. Quigley cites 
James on the philosopher's role of determining how "contrast ing worlds" relate as he argues for 
" a correspondence between the activity of the philosopher, the role of the critic, and the 
engagement of an audience with a play because the unavoidable implication of the modern 
theatre's insistence on distinctive grounds of knowing is that participation in what the theatre has 
to offer involves philosophical work" (43). For Quigley Pinter 's plays exemplify " the drama of 
inquiry in a pluralistic un iverse" (262) and are most "appropr ia te ly" approached as such. 
41 . Quigley refers to the Modern Drama articles on The Dumb Waiter by himself and Van Laan 
(225n7). Elsewhere Quigley observes that Van Laan "underest imates, to some extent, the degree 
to which audience understanding in general, and literary interpretation in particular, involve the 
making of connections between, and the locating of thematic patterns among, distinct textural 
e lements , " though he considers "entirely r ight" Van Laan 's " two main points—that we can 
overread plays by inventing rather than inferring connections, and that to do so with a Pinter play 
is to eradicate one of its distinctive and important features"; the " t a s k " of the critic, Quigley 
concludes, is " t o achieve the appropriate generic balance between inferential connection and 
functional discontinuity" ("Design and Discovery" 83n2; emphasis added). Some feel that 
Pinter mocks such a notion in Teddy 's only long speech, cited below, calling into question the 
philosopher's ability to " s e e " any more appropriately than anyone else. 
42. Quigley's " e n h a n c e m e n t " of Pinter extends Van Laan 's : 
The disturbing events in Pinter plays characteristically serve to remind us that the 
explanations we rely on in our daily lives tend often to be incomplete and that we 
frequently resort to rounding them out with guesses based upon not clearly justifiable 
assumptions. Consequently, further inspection of a situation is likely to generate not 
clearer explanations but more confusion, as our guesses and assumptions fail to stand up 
to further scrutiny. 
Pinter parallels "Heisenberg ' s uncertainty principle in scientific inqui ry" suggesting that " o u r 
methods of explanation can in part constitute the data to be explained" and providing " a n 
alarming potential for circularity in our explanatory activities." Such circularity occurs in 
scientific analysis of matter into particles in accordance with Einstein's theory of relativity: " the 
proliferation of new particles might well result from the methods used to locate them. That which 
is to be explained in part results from, and is in part constituted by, the method of examining and 
explaining i t " (MS 224). Cf. Klein on connections between Heisenberg's "radical revision of our 
conception of the universe and our epistemological relation to i t " and " the rudimentary tension 
and mechanism of Pinter 's work" (192); Fuegi on Beckett's and Pinter 's "world where the 
principle of uncertainty is maintained in the form, structure, and language of the aesthetic 
construct i t s e l f and on the "uncer ta in future" of " the drama of uncertainty" (207); Cima on 
effects of Pinter 's use of " t h e Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy" on performance and 
interpretation (52); and Deemer on Pinter 's developing " a world on stage that mirrors the 
strange new world of the new physics [Quantum Mechanics ] . " 
43. T h e "well-made p lay" may persist, Quigley speculates, because it embodies 
an attitude towards explanation and truth that is not at all untypical of attitudes we 
frequently bring to bear on our own lives. There is, we usually feel, for any situation in 
which we find ourselves, a basic explanation. If we have not yet found it, we fault 
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ourselves, not the situation. With more effort and more ingenuity, we could, we feel sure, 
locate the basic truths that govern a particular context in which we find ourselves. (MS 
223) 
It is " this assumption of available, if not immediately accessible, cer ta inty" that Pinter aims 
"bo th to activate and to challenge" (223). Despite this recognition that Pinter questions our 
strategies for locating such "basic t r u th s , " nevertheless Quigley himself still locates what he calls 
the "basic t h e m e " of Betrayal (244). 
44. Quigley argues: 
For Pinter, we live somewhere between the poles of objectivity and subjectivity . . . in 
worlds that threaten to slide towards one or the other. Consequently, we tend to alternate 
between, on the one hand, a comforting assumption that somewhere out there, just 
beyond our current reach, lie ultimate truths and final explanations, and, on the other, an 
intermittent awareness that a dizzying variety of possible truths and explanations seems to 
be available. It is the predominance of the former assumption, this expectation that 
certainty will ultimately be accessible, that Pinter finds most worrying, both in the typical 
themes of the well-made play and in the typical activities of our daily lives, and he is at 
pains to establish the importance of the other alternative. . . . But Pinter 's concern is not 
to dramatize one alternative at the expense of another. Rather it is to explore social 
interaction in the context of certainty confronting and negotiating with doubt, doubt 
negotiating with other doubt, and certainty with other certainty. (MS 224-25) 
45. Quigley's interactive model, though it uses "theatrical hor izons" (borrowing Jauss ' s 
structure for reception—horizons of expectations), does not seem to address the issue of the 
unpredictability of response (See M S 32). In his " In t roduc t ion" to Jauss , Aesthetics, de M a n suggests 
some limitations of this concept and " the horizon of Jauss 's methodology," though he compares 
" a n element of not-knowing . . . built within the model of the hor izon" with " a n element of 
indeterminacy and arbi trar iness" implied by " the concept of literary s ign" (xii-xviii). Cf. 
Hudgins ' application of Jauss ' s "receptional aesthetic" in defining " i n d e x e s " of " in tended 
audience response" for The Homecoming (esp. 103-05, 115). 
46. This "reformulation . . . helps us to locate the importance of Pinter 's attempts to 
combine the much maligned conventions of nineteenth-century theatre with the epistemologically 
based innovations of the modern thea t re" (MS 226). Alluding to his own earlier writing about 
" the peculiar problems" of Pinter 's dialogue, Quigley now locates "similar p rob lems" 
throughout " the entire texture and s t ructure" of Pinter 's plays, extending his earlier thesis about 
the "interrelational function of dia logue" (PP) to all features of Pinter 's plays. Now (for his 
present "purposes" ) " the key issue" in each play he examines is " t he peculiar mode of 
interaction established between the commonplace and the unusual, the traditional and the 
experimental, the practical and the epistemological. . . . " Of course he finds these " fac to rs" to 
"achieve a startling structural and thematic embodiment" in Pinter 's " c o m p l e x " play he is 
about to examine, Betrayal (MS 226-27). 
47. Deemer sees Pinter mocking the " N e w t o n i a n " belief that " there is a world 'out there, ' 
that we stand aside and observe this world objectively; that, like Teddy . . . we can operate ' on ' 
things and not ' in ' things. Tha t it is possible to be an impartial observer ." Cf. Hudgins: "Teddy 
briefly advocates a more healthful balance between objectivity and subjectivity, but ironically 
cannot achieve it and is even unaware of his failure"; Pinter intends " T h e audience . . . to 
identify with or recognize such failure, which necessitates both a refusal of escapist, objective 
'certainty' and a willingness to change" (112). As Carpenter suggests, many critics of The 
Homecoming have demonstrated neither this refusal not this willingness. Pinter has said, Lahr 
reports, " tha t if ever there was a villain in [The Homecoming], Teddy was i t " (169). Michael Craig, 
who played Teddy in the 1967 NY production, said that " u n d e r n e a t h " his rationalizations of his 
"aggress ions ," Teddy is " E i c h m a n n " (quoted in Hewes 57). Also cf. Dukore 174-77. Elliott 
catalogues other responses to Teddy (464-68). 
48. The arguments about The Dumb Waiter and Pinter 's plays are " recapi tu la ted" in the 
"philosophical" debate in The Homecoming (3: 68-69). 
49. I allude here to a variety of critical approaches to Pinter 's plays: the thematic, e.g., Gale, 
Butter's Going Up; the myth-ritual, e.g., Burkman; and the psychoanalytic, e.g., Gordon, Esslin, 
and Gabbard. I discuss them in detail in Pinter in Play. 
50. Tener observes that for Ruth " a s for Pinter in [The Homecoming), the essence of a thing lies 
in movement. . . . Things . . . have value as movement, as the senses perceive them, not as 
structures for the mind to create and hide beh ind" (179). Pinter has publicly eschewed criticism 
for living; sex, cricket, and language are among experiences that he has named his favorites. He 
reiterated his love for them in the discussion after his 1981 talk at the U of East Anglia. Pinter has 
said that he enjoys the process of writing, reading, acting, and other forms of working and playing 
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more than intellectual or theoretical analysis. " A Play and Its Politics" suggests a shift in this 
public attitude. 
51 . Still more common is the conventional or traditional hierarchy of values by which 
" l i t e ra tu re" is more valued than "cr i t ic i sm." Some proponents of new versions of "cultural 
s tudies" are at tempting to reverse this hierarchy. " T h i s opposition between the literary and the 
philosophical is another version of the opposition between writing and speech," Culler says. 
"Cer ta in qualities of language are attributed to writing/literature so that they can be treated as 
parasitical or derivative and so that the purity and direct relation to thought or truth of speech/ 
philosophy may be preserved" ("Jacques De r r i da" 177-78). Such "deconstructive reversals" or 
"strategic intervent ions" as those that Derrida has applied to the speech/writing and philoso-
phy/literature oppositions have, since Derrida, been widely applied to the criticism/literature 
opposition, with criticism being considered either as a special case (a " k i n d , " or " g e n r e " ) of 
philosophical discourse or as a special case of literary discourse. For further discussion, see Culler, 
PS and OD. As distinctions between literature and criticism have been collapsed into writing, both 
" k i n d s " of writing are viewed as " rhe to r ica l " in function and as characterized by "rhetorical 
s trategies," resulting in a new critical " h e g e m o n y , " whose status is also reversible. 
52. Cf. de M a n on reading as " a n act of understanding that can never be observed, nor in any 
way prescribed or verified. . . . Criticism is a metaphor for the act of reading, and this act is itself 
inexhaustible" (Blindness and Insight 107). As some metaphors die, become clichés, others are born 
(invented) to take their place. M u c h writing would die sooner perhaps if other writing did not 
keep it alive, resulting in protracted overkill. "Cr ippled by their need to rely on a system of 
linguistic significance to explore Pinter 's complex sign system, in which visual signs frequently 
overpower linguistic or even verbal o n e s , " C ima observes, "P in te r critics and performers often 
depend upon metaphors to elucidate his work" ; she recommends: "Those metaphors ought to 
share the objectivity and visual orientation, the mutability, of the scripts themselves" (56). 
53. O n this concept of metaphor (la métaphore vive), see Ricoeur. Cf. LakofF and Johnson on 
" N e w M e a n i n g " (139-46). See also their discussions of " l imi ta t ions" and " inadequacies" of the 
" m y t h s " of "object iv ism" and "subject ivism" and what they call " t he experientialist alter-
na t ive" (210-28). The i r summary sees " t h e experientialist myth as capable of satisfying the real 
and reasonable concerns that have motivated the myths of both subjectivism and objectivism but 
without either the objectivist obsession with absolute truth or the subjectivist insistence that 
imagination is totally unrest r ic ted" (228). While they recognize understanding as the goal of all 
such myths, they recommend the experientialist myth as a "perspect ive" able to meet the 
concerns of objectivism with success in the external world and those of subjectivism with reaching 
internal or ^^-unders tanding . Taking this "perspective of man as part of his envi ronment" yields 
understanding through " in te rac t ion , " "constant negotiation with the environment and other 
people" (229-30). 
54. Cohen cautions, " W e ought not forget that 'subtext ' is a metaphor for an author 's 
unstated, unwrit ten ' text . ' The actual subtext is written by the critic, who, in writing it, becomes 
himself an a u t h o r " (381). 
55. Lakoff and Johnson observe the importance of realizing " tha t the way we have been 
brought up to perceive our world is not the only way and that it is possible to see beyond the 
' t ru ths ' of our cu l tu re" (239). " B u t , " they qualify, "metaphors are not merely things to be seen 
beyond. In fact, one can see beyond them only by using other metaphors . " (Theirs here is in/act: 
a figure of speech as much as Gus and Ben's "light the kett le .") They conclude: 
It is as though the ability to comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like 
seeing or touching or hearing, with metaphors providing the only ways to perceive and 
experience much of the world. Metaphor is as much a part of our functioning as our sense 
of touch, and as precious. 
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